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One of the enduring issues in schooling is the way in which it reproduces advantage
and disadvantage in society, at the very least evidenced in the strong correlation
between low socioeconomic class and low student achievement. It is a problem that is
evident throughout much of the ‘northern’ world. In Australia, for example, national
literacy and numeracy tests that occur at regular intervals throughout a student’s
schooling clearly demonstrate an expanding achievement gap between students of high
and low socioeconomic status as they progress from one grade to the next. Similarly,
while Australian students perform well on PISA tests when compared with students
from other OECD countries, the nation also has a long tail of under-achievement that
is characterised by students from low social class backgrounds.
In the last decade or so, explanations for these disparities have been framed in
terms of teacher quality. The argument is that students from poor backgrounds
perform poorly at school because of the poor teaching they receive. Certainly research
by Newmann (Newmann and Wehlage 1993; Newmann and Associates 1996),
Ladwig et al. (2000) Lingard et al. (2001) suggest that teachers can make a significant
difference to students’ academic performances, particularly for those from disadvan-
taged backgrounds. By comparison, the reductionism of the teacher effectiveness liter-
ature would have us believe that the quality of teaching is ‘the’ difference between
students’ academic achievements, conveniently avoiding all mention of their socio-
economic and other circumstances.
Irrespective of their theoretical orientations, pedagogy now dominates the agenda
of most school systems in the global ‘North’, as it does in society more generally
(Bernstein 2001). With belief in teaching as the defining difference between students’
achievement, performance pay for teachers is firmly on the agenda as is a particular
version of teacher mobility: moving ‘good’ teachers into the ‘bad’ schools to help
students lift their performance. Why is it, then, that the pedagogy they have in mind
lacks the critical edge that Paulo Freire first employed in parts of South America? In
responding to new social, economic and environmental pressures, why has critical
pedagogy failed to capture the imagination?
In this review essay we engage with the argument, made throughout McLaren and
Kincheloe’s edited collection Critical Pedagogy: Where Are We Now?, that the field
of critical pedagogy is at a conceptual crossroads. We begin by distinguishing
between the form and content of thought in order to argue that this edited collection
gives primacy to the critique of how we think rather than what we think. This form/
content distinction enables a meta-analysis of the arguments developed across the
chapters of the book in order to map the current crossroads and to suggest paths that
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104  S. Sellar and T. Gale
may be productively pursued from here. We follow this introductory section with an
overview of the book’s structure, and the themes that recur across its chapters, in order
to consider the emphasis placed on finding new resources for transforming how we
are able to think about the problems critical education seeks to address. We then
extend our reading of the book to an analysis of the relationship between form and
content of thought across elite and non-elite educational sites. This analysis attempts
to explain the different function of thought contents across these sites and draws atten-
tion to the formation of thought as the primary function of mainstream institutional
schooling. We conclude by drawing implications from our reading of the text for the
next iteration of critical pedagogical work.
Where are we now: shifting the emphasis from content to form
In the final chapter of Critical Pedagogy: Where Are We Now?, speaking to an audi-
ence of critically minded friends, William B. Stanley (p. 372) argues that ‘something
is not quite right with our prevailing analysis of mainstream education and society’.
This sentiment is echoed throughout the edited collection; for example, when it is
suggested that ‘the field is at a conceptual crossroads’ (Kincheloe, p. 13) and is ‘stuck
in the sloppy mud of dying theories’ (Weiner, p. 59). Many of the chapters in this book
offer similar diagnoses and, while these may vary in detail, there appears to be some
consensus that the patient is in poor health. However, the various prescriptions for
good health proceed divergently from this analysis. There are, of course, theoretical
resources that commonly inform many of the prescriptions, most notably the exem-
plary work of Paulo Friere, while transformative social justice and the pursuit of
participatory democracy provide a common horizon even when particular authors
pursue new theoretical directions.
However, in the final moments of the book any expectation that a coherent theory
or method may be derived from these chapters, based on their common ethical inten-
tions, is unsettled by a series of questions. Admonishing critical pedagogues for not
taking the theoretical work of their neoliberal and conservative political opponents
seriously, Stanley (p. 372) argues in the final chapter that ‘critical educators often
lament our mainstream opponent’s failure to invest the intellectual effort to under-
stand critical pedagogy … To what extent, however, do critical educators reciprocate
in kind?’ Even more incisively: ‘How likely is it that small groups of critical educators
(and their political allies) are the only ones who really understand what is wrong with
our society and educational system?’ It is hard to resist the immediate response:
not very.
This is not cause for resignation. The unlikelihood of critical pedagogues having
sole claim to the ‘right’ diagnosis (both in the sense of being accurate and entitled) of
a sick society and education system, and the corresponding prescription for good
health, only appears problematic when the project of critical pedagogy is narrowly
conceived as the critique of thought contents or what one thinks. But something
important is missed when critique ends here. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that
‘thought contents are sometimes criticized for being too conformist. But the primary
question is that of form itself’ (p. 374). In other words, arguing for and against
contents of thought may blind us to a more important question concerning how we
think. This is an ethico-political question for which there cannot be a definitive
response, because it places in question and therefore exceeds epistemological frames
within which any response may be evaluated as more or less conclusive. It is a
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Pedagogy, Culture & Society  105
question that implies the extension of critique into a corresponding creativity, since
calling into question the form of thought implies the creation of new ways of thinking.
In this essay we draw upon this analytical separation of thought – into content of
thought and form of thought – and Deleuze’s argument that thought in its orthodox
form is generally presupposed and enjoys a privileged legitimacy. Deleuze argues that
the orthodox form of thought, valued in European and Northern American philosoph-
ical traditions, rests upon the Cartesian assumption that ‘what is meant by thinking,
being and self – in other words, not a particular this or that but the form of represen-
tation or recognition in general’ (1994, 131) is universally acknowledged. This
assumption renders opaque the spatio-temporal conditions in which thought emerges
and the relationship between forms of thought and forms of geopolitical organisation
such as the State.
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) geophilosophical approach draws attention to these
conditions and emphasises the relationship between the orthodox form of thought and
the imperial aspirations of the State.1 Connell (2007) develops a similar argument
through a reading of general social theory in geopolitical terms. Her reading emphasises
the relationship between social thought and ‘the long-lasting pattern of inequality in
power, wealth and cultural influence that grew historically out of European and North
American imperialism’ (2007, 212). Connell attributes a ‘Northernness’ to dominant
social theories that make a ‘strong and repeated claim to universal relevance’ (2007,
44) and are primarily concerned with ‘the problems of metropolitan society … [and
therefore erase] the experience of the majority of human kind from the foundations of
social thought’ (2007, 46).2 While Deleuze and Guattari’s argument is philosophical
and Connell’s is social-theoretical, we wish to draw from them more generally to
emphasise the imperialism of the orthodox form of thought that is developed and valued
within institutional schooling across advanced capitalist nation-states.3
If we liken the orthodox form of thought to a game,4 then critical pedagogical work
undertaken as a contest over thought contents risks implicitly accepting and reifying
the rules governing this contest. Once we have accepted these rules, the validity of our
thought contents is judged in these terms. If we assume this game is the only one worth
playing, an anaemic concept of thought emerges in which the ethical and aesthetic
dimensions – so crucial for the critical pedagogical project – are curtailed. Instrumen-
tal (or techno-scientific) reason is given precedence over ethico-politics when thought
is presupposed in its orthodox form, because the validity of ethical arguments are
considered to be derived from epistemological criteria. Further, the creative and trans-
formative potential of thought is foreclosed: we can have different thoughts provided
we do not think differently, for this can only mean courting error, stupidity, or naivety.
When we surrender these ethical and aesthetic resources, by assuming the goal of
the dominant game as the only one worth pursuing, we lose our capacity for resistance.
When we restrict ourselves to critique of content, and agree to play by the rules, we
accept conformity at the level of how we think in order to engage in debate over what
we should think. In this sense, the orthodox form of thought ‘aspires to universality’
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 379). The proper exercise of thought is considered to
produce legitimate ideas and the right to demand others acknowledge these ideas, or
prove them illegitimate through more skilful play within the rules. The pretext of
promoting diversity at the level of content dissimulates the production of homogene-
ity, and an imperialist aspiration, at the level of form. The orthodox game is one of
convincing others based on an appeal to the rules, and in the terms of this game
definitive understanding appears to be the goal most worth pursuing.
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106  S. Sellar and T. Gale
But what about when critical pedagogy is conceived as a struggle over thought at
the level of its form? This would be a contest to change the rules of the game, and to
create others, rather than winning in the terms of the dominant game. Once the bound-
aries of any particular game are exceeded, primacy is given to ethico-political and
aesthetic evaluations rather than epistemological criteria. Convincing others appears
much less worthwhile than learning how to listen across epistemological frames and
allowing ourselves to be transformed by what we hear.
In our view, the strength of this edited collection is the emphasis it places on such
transformation at the level of how we think. While the concepts of form and content
are not explicitly developed within the text, we believe that many of the arguments
made throughout this collection can usefully be read in these terms. For example,
many of the theoretical chapters attempt to engage conceptual resources from outside
the orthodox form of thought, or the domain of Northern theory, while the overall
structure of the book constitutes an open system in which conflicting and divergent
prescriptions for renewed critical pedagogy are juxtaposed, at times in contradiction,
without synthesis into an overarching cohesive method or theory. There is an emphasis
upon listening to the other and exploring new forms of thought, rather than developing
unified and universal prescriptions in terms of the orthodox form, which Connell
describes as ‘reading from the centre’ (2007, 45).
Before we develop these ideas further, and as a way of setting up our analysis, it
is important to describe in more detail the edited collection’s structure and the argu-
ments developed by its authors. Of course, the book’s form and contents are worthy
of review in their own right.
Overview of the book: arguments and structure
Critical Pedagogy: Where Are We Now? is a collection of essays, edited by Peter
McLaren and Joe Kincheloe, that respond to the provocation of the title. The book is
thematically divided into three sections: theoretical, pedagogical, and political. The
first and last sections are organised in relation to current problems for the field, while
the middle section takes a representative approach and attempts to provide examples
of critical pedagogy across different stages of schooling, subject disciplines, and
socio-political contexts. The first section is characterised by an attempt to find new
ways of thinking about critical pedagogy. Kincheloe turns to indigenous epistemolo-
gies and resources drawn from post-Cartesian cognitive science; Wexler (p. 54) draws
on Weber’s pursuit of a ‘mystical alternative to the iron cage of rationalism’ to propose
a resacralisation of education; and Weiner (p. 75) argues for a critical imaginary that
is ‘artistic, inventive, speculative’ and ‘should embrace the abstract and lead the way
in rewriting categories of the real’. This first section of the book seeks to call into ques-
tion the orthodox form of thought and emphasises the need for it to be transformed by
ways of thinking that have traditionally constituted its outside.
The second section of the book comprises a series of examples, which vary in style
from descriptions of situated practice to arguments for the relevance of various disci-
pline-specific critical pedagogies (e.g. critical pedagogies for early childhood and
music education). The rich descriptions of situated practice make useful contributions
to the field as examples that demonstrate, in a similar manner to the work of Ira Shor
(1987, 1996), how critical theory can be enacted in the classroom without reducing it
to a general method or technique. In this section, Duncan-Andrade and Morrell’s
description of their development of critical pedagogy in urban classrooms, using
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Pedagogy, Culture & Society  107
popular culture as a resource for critical literacy education, provides a compelling
example of critical pedagogical work in practice. Fischman and Gandin’s description
of Citizen Schools in Brazil provides similarly inspiring and generative evidence that
more democratic forms of schooling are possible. This example also draws attention
to the need for transformation of thought at the level of form, in order to democratise
knowledge practices. In their view: 
Curricular transformation is more than making sure students are going to be offered
access to traditional knowledge required for an educated and enlightened citizenry. The
Citizen School project goes beyond the incorporation of new knowledge within the
margins of an intact ‘core of human wisdom.’ It is a radical transformation aimed at
constructing a new epistemological understanding about what counts as knowledge.
(p. 216)
The third section of the book is ostensibly political, though it returns to the theoretical
tone of the first, and begins with McLaren’s call for a revolutionary critical pedagogy.
This approach gives primacy to class as a category of analysis and is staunchly anti-
capitalist in practice. Echoing Marx, McLaren emphasises the complicity between the
orthodox form of thought and the interests of capital and the State: ‘The prevailing
categories and forms of thought used today to justify foreign and domestic policy in
capitalist societies … manifest a certain universality and often reveal the imprint of
the ruling class’ (p. 290). Although McLaren is referring to particular categories at the
level of content, such as the concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ used to legitimate
the spread of global capital, his argument signals the dominance of the orthodox form
of thought in which this logic of capital and empire is developed.
In the following two chapters Grande and De Lissovoy argue for sophisticated
analysis of the intersection between colonialism and capitalism in order to add further
analytical nuance to the development of revolutionary critical pedagogies. Grande
emphasises the disconnect between orthodox epistemology – in which critical argu-
ment has traditionally been developed – and indigenous epistemologies: ‘The radical
constructs of democratization, subjectivity, and citizenship all remain defined through
Western epistemological frames. As such, they carry certain assumptions about … the
primacy of the rational process’ (p. 320). Drawing on the work of Franz Fanon, and
arguing for the need ‘to deconstruct normative ideas of success and failure’ (p. 362),
De Lissovoy argues that ‘the dominant understanding [a game in which success is
always premised on the failure of others; a zero-sum game] dooms itself to failure as
far as real transformation is concerned, since this understanding does not confront the
logic that produces both the “problems” and “solutions” at once’ (p. 361). Transfor-
mative projects must look beyond the flawed logic of this form of thinking. Both of
these chapters allude to the imperial aspirations of the orthodox form of thought and
emphasise the need to draw on alternative resources as tools for resistance.
The collection concludes with Stanley’s chapter, in which he challenges ‘the large
numbers of educators across the political spectrum who, whatever their other differ-
ences, refuse to give up claims of privileged access to foundations for epistemological
and/or axiological knowledge’.5
Yet despite this tripartite organisation, there is relatively little cohesion across the
chapters. The editorial approach appears to be one of ‘bricolage’, although this
approach is nowhere made explicit, and the collection is somewhat fragmented. Any
overarching synthesis that would privilege a particular standpoint has been rejected:
there is no introductory chapter that lays out a common framework, nor a concluding
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108  S. Sellar and T. Gale
chapter that charts a single path back or forward. The chapters are allowed to sit along-
side one another and the productive tensions, produced by differences in genre and
argument, highlight the diverse intellectual and pedagogical work that can arise from
similar ethico-political commitments.
Still, there are a number of themes that emerge across the chapters as certain lines
of argument are reiterated. These include the increasingly urgent need for theoretical
and practical renewal of critical pedagogy in our current moment, which is character-
ised by: an intersection of resurgent imperialism and unfettered capitalism; the need
to avoid any complicity with the permeating logic of capital that would diminish the
revolutionary intent of critical pedagogy; the need for greater popular connection and
attention to the affective dimension of political work; the need to resist any reduction
of critical pedagogy to a method or technique; and, as we have already suggested, the
need to engage with other ways of knowing in order to challenge and resist the impe-
rialist aspirations of the orthodox form of thought. These recurrent themes provide
the book with connecting threads that traverse its fragmentation. While many of the
arguments developed in its chapters emphasise the need to engage new forms of
thought, this fragmentation at the level of the book’s structure seems entirely neces-
sary in order that it perform the kind of pedagogy that such engagement requires. As
Connell argues, 
the alternative to ‘northern theory’ is not a unified doctrine from the global South. No
such body of thought exists nor could it exist. Indeed, one of the problems of northern
theory is its characteristic idea that theory must be monological, declaring the one truth
in one voice. It seems to me that a genuinely global sociology must … be more like a
conversation among many voices. (2006, 262)
This book constitutes an attempt to engage in such a conversation. However, we must
acknowledge that the arguments developed across this collection (except perhaps for
Denzin’s chapter on performance pedagogy) are largely developed in terms of the
orthodox form of thought. Calling this form into question, and finding paths down
which it may be transformed, is no simple matter. Many further experiments with
other forms of thought, and conversations with others who understand the world
differently, are required. Hence, this collection continually points beyond itself to
further work along new paths for critical pedagogy.
Theorising form/content across elite and non-elite educational spaces
Our analysis of the text, in which it is approached as a call to place the form of thought
in question, is a departure down one such path. However, we would want to take this
analysis a step further, in order to apply the form and content distinction to a consid-
eration of the different function of pedagogies across elite and non-elite sites. Our
argument, perhaps not unlike that of others although differently expressed, is that one
of the primary purposes of schooling is to form in students habits of thought, and that
thought contents assume a secondary role in relation to this process.
Figure 1 illustrates the different relations we imagine between form and content
across elite and non-elite educational spaces. In non-elite sites, such as primary schools
and schools serving communities that privilege epistemologies outside the orthodox
form, form is more fluid and variable. In these sites content may be restricted and
invariable in order to provide a medium for the development of, or apprenticeship into,
the orthodox form of thinking. In elite sites – such as the latter phases of education or
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Pedagogy, Culture & Society  109
schooling serving communities that privilege and develop orthodox epistemologies
outside school – form is more stable and invariable. In these sites content may be varied
because conformity is relatively assured at the level of form. Where form is contested,
homogenised content constitutes a mould or apprenticeship into the orthodox form.
Where form is uncontested, content may diversify whilst conforming to the orthodox
form.
Figure 1. Form–content relation across elite/non-elite sites.Drawing on two examples from the book, which are particularly suggestive of this
relationship, we take some preliminary steps further down the path of this form–
content analysis of schooling. In the first example, and in relation to their work using
popular culture as a curriculum artifact, Duncan-Andrade and Morrell (p. 187) argue
that shaping common popular culture into more sophisticated forms is a core function
of schooling. Given this function, it is not surprising that the use of popular culture as
curriculum content may often be resisted in primary and secondary schools. 
The irony here is that popular culture has always found a central place in the most elite
of postsecondary educational institutions; and popular culture has consistently been a
site of study by the most elite of society’s philosophers and cultural theorists in the twen-
tieth (and now twenty-first) centuries. (p. 187)
This irony suggests an inverse relationship between the role of content in elite and
non-elite settings: in elite settings content appears to be more variable, while in non-
elite settings it is more invariable or tightly constrained.
In the second example, Leistyna addresses the push for English-only anti-bilingual
policies in US public schools, and identifies a similar inversion between the content
considered legitimate in elite and non-elite sites. 
It is curious that so many mainstream politicians concerned with public education work
so hard to eradicate multilingualism among racially and economically oppressed
students, while simultaneously working to make certain that upper-middle-class and
wealthy youth are able to speak international languages. Multilingualism, which is
embraced in all the finest private schools in the country … is great for elite children but
somehow bad for, and unpatriotic of, the poor. (p. 120, n5)
It seems clear that social reproduction theories, especially in relation to this second
example, offer insight into this inversion. Students from non-elite backgrounds are
provided with a vocational curriculum in which multilingualism is considered
unnecessary while elite students are provided with an academic curriculum in which
multilingualism may increase their chances of gaining access to tertiary education.
But this does not entirely explain the vehemence of advocates attempting to erad-
icate multilingual education for oppressed students, for whom bilingualism would not
seem to hold any significant prospects for challenging established sorting and selecting
Invariable 
Variable
Elite sites Non-elite sites 
Form
Form
Content
Content
Figure 1. Form–content relation across elite/non-elite sites.
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110  S. Sellar and T. Gale
mechanisms. While the second example contrasts schools along class lines, in terms
of wealthy versus poor schools, the first example contrasts them according to the stage
of schooling. In this instance, primary and secondary schools are considered to be non-
elite in contrast to elite tertiary institutions. This difference between content sanctioned
in elite sites and non-elite sites is, we argue, illustrative of the primary focus that main-
stream schooling places on shaping the form of thought as a means of organising and
governing social space. The most crucial sites of this formation are those where
thought is more unqualified, such as the earlier stages of schooling, or spaces where
the dominant form of thought must struggle for legitimacy against other cultural
practices and epistemologies. Winning assent to the dominant form of thought in these
spaces, and thereby ensuring its legitimacy, is an important project in order to sustain
the logic of capital and the State.
As an instrument of the State, schooling functions to shape rational citizens that
give their consensus to the State-form as the reasonable organisation of society.
Citizens are free to have different views, provided they are reasonable and can be
discussed and debated in a rational manner. With Deleuze and Guattari (1994), we
argue that States are ‘models of realisation’ of universal capitalism and, as such, are
fundamentally complicit with the effectuation and maintenance of the market. While
nation-states can vary widely in their structure, at the level of form they maintain a
similarity that facilitates economies of exchange within and between them. This same
principle holds for thought as well: capital can tolerate the most wide-ranging varia-
tion at the level of content, provided there is conformity at the level of form, which
enables the communication and exchange of ideas within knowledge economies.
The formation of thought is a process undertaken for high stakes: the legitimacy
of the State consensus and the perpetuation of economies of exchange. Such formation
can be conceived as a striation of mental space, or a kind of imperialism of one domi-
nant form of thinking: ‘the classical image of thought, and the striating of mental
space it effects, aspires to universality’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 379). In order to
resist this universality it must not be presupposed. For this reason, the primary
question for critical and transformative pedagogical work must be that of form.
In order to begin raising this question, we turn first to a consideration of the rela-
tion between this formative function and thought contents in non-elite sites, which we
characterise as frontiers of this mental striation process. We then consider how this
relation becomes inverted in elite sites.
Non-elite sites, where the orthodox form often encounters other ways of thinking,
constitute a kind of frontier in mental space where the form of thought is relatively
contested. Where the orthodox form is not the way of thinking primarily valued in
students’ homes and communities, its legitimacy may not appear self-evident.
However, proficiency in the dominant form is still necessary because of the access to
power that it provides. Critical pedagogies acknowledge this tension to the extent that
they seek to provide students from outside of the ‘culture of power’ (Delpit 1995) with
the capacity to think and speak in powerful ways, while at the same time acknowledg-
ing and seeking to honour ways of thinking not traditionally valued at school. In these
spaces, thought content acts as the medium through which thought may be shaped in
the orthodox form. In spaces where the form of thought is contested or fluid, thought
contents must be more stable.
For example, engaging with canonical literary texts provides an apprenticeship in
the orthodox form of thought. As students engage with and make sense of these texts,
they become versed in the dominant way of thinking. In this sense, including and
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Pedagogy, Culture & Society  111
valuing popular or lifeworld content in these sites holds critical possibilities because
it constitutes a resistance to the universalism of the orthodox form. Hence, Duncan-
Andrade and Morrell describe the use of popular culture texts, in juxtaposition with
canonical texts, as a way of pursuing a both/and approach to critical pedagogy. 
While we respected and honoured some of the current literary canon and encouraged our
students to gain a mastery and appreciation of that literary canon, we also recognized that
the canon was limiting in ways that were problematic and ultimately disempowering to
our students … Our students were being given implicit and explicit messages about what
texts were aesthetic or intellectual … in ways that excluded, even condemned, the
traditional and new media texts that they interacted with on a daily basis. (p. 187)
Diversifying the thought contents granted legitimacy in non-elite sites, by engaging
with content valued by students’ in their lives outside of school, holds critical possi-
bilities to the extent that it undermines the sole claim to legitimacy often granted to
the dominant form of thought.6
In contrast to the function of content as a formative medium in non-elite sites, we
argue that content functions as a medium of diversification in elite sites. The dominant
form of thought is more stable in elite sites, as social reproduction theories have
demonstrated, because it is formed and valued within elite and middle-class homes
and brought to school as the presupposed way of thinking. Proficiency in this domi-
nant form is recognised by assessment mechanisms, which provide the credentials
required for access to power and privilege (such as access to higher education), and
this results in the form remaining relatively stable and uncontested in elite spaces. The
orthodox form of thought gains increasing gravity across the stages of schooling as it
is ratified by assessment mechanisms and rewarded with success. However, it may
still be relatively unstable in the earlier stages of schooling, even in elite sites, because
it has not yet been iteratively reinforced through assessment and the sorting and select-
ing of students. Once students reach tertiary levels of education, the orthodox form has
been reinforced and is relatively stable and uncontested.
Where the form of thought is uncontested, thought contents can be varied while
remaining in conformity with the orthodox way of thinking. In fact, it may be espe-
cially beneficial to do so when this variation enables thought contents to be capitalised
on, within knowledge economies: turning thought to ever newer content is essential to
maintain a profitable trade in ideas. Diversity of thought contents, and the freedom to
debate and discuss them, also enables a consensual mode of democracy in which
superficial differences in opinion dissimulate a more profound conformity of thought.
Therefore, in elite spaces, diverse and potentially nonconformist thought contents are
acceptable provided they are developed and defended reasonably and rationally.
This form–content analysis emphasises the homogenisation of content as a
response to the diversification of form in spaces where thought is contested, and the
heterogeneity of content in spaces where form is stable and uncontested. It draws
attention to the struggle over form which may be rendered opaque when the focus is
on analysis and critique at the level of content.
Conclusion: towards creative critique
What implications does this form–content analysis hold for our understanding of
critical pedagogy? It suggests that schooling is primarily concerned with the orthodox
formation of thought and that this form must be placed in question, rather than
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assumed, by critical pedagogy. Weiner’s argument for critical imagination in order to
rewrite ‘categories of the real’ (p. 75) is suggestive of how to approach such question-
ing. It involves both unsettling the perceived reality of current categories and the
creation of new ones. For example, Kincheloe argues: 
a central dimension of the new phase of critical pedagogy involves researching
subjugated and indigenous knowledges, incorporating them into the development of the
discipline of critical pedagogy, and using them to enhance education in general and
indigenous/aboriginal education in particular in a multilogical, globalized world. (p. 18)
Subjugated knowledge holds potential for unsettling the legitimacy of dominant
knowledge provided the research called for by Kincheloe is sensitive to the form–
content distinction. The potential for transformation is significantly diminished if
subjugated knowledge is approached as thought content to be incorporated. For
example, consider the teacher of a student from a subjugated culture, or a very young
student from the dominant culture, who listens to them explain how they understand
the world, and considerately valorises this version, before explaining how things really
are. The student’s way of thinking is incorporated as content in terms of the orthodox
form of thought and understood in these terms. It becomes another exotic object in the
meticulously ordered museum of rationality and the categories of the real are trans-
formed only in order to progressively subsume what lays outside them. However, if
subjugated knowledge is understood to imply a different form of thought, and we grant
this thought legitimacy and try to learn from it, the potential for transformation is
increased; and so is the risk and discomfort for those operating in terms of the dominant
form. Rather than considerately acknowledging other forms of thought and incorpo-
rating them as contents in the orthodox form – rational explanations of how the other
thinks – we must take other forms of thought seriously. In doing so, there is a risk that
we will not be taken seriously by others who remain committed to the sovereignty of
the orthodox form.
Connell suggests that departing from the terms of ‘northern theory’ involves ‘risks
to professional credibility (consider what an acceptable citation list is for a paper in a
“mainstream” North Atlantic journal)’ (2006, 263). Massumi describes similar risks
involved in pursuing experimental and creative lines in philosophy: 
If you know where you will end up when you begin, nothing has happened in the mean-
time. You have to be willing to surprise yourself writing things you didn’t think you
thought … You have to let yourself get so caught up in the flow of your writing that it
ceases at moments to be recognizable to you as your own … with inattention comes risk:
of silliness or even outbreaks of stupidity … you have to be willing to ‘affirm’ even your
own stupidity. (2002, 18)
The next iteration of critical pedagogy must involve not knowing where we will end
up and a willingness to be inattentive to how we should think. If we place the orthodox
form of thought in question, and vulnerably listen to the thought of others in order that
our thought be transformed, we risk thinking in new ways that will appear unorthodox.
But this unorthodoxy is the capacity for resistance that we surrender as soon as we
recuperate strange and unfamiliar thoughts in orthodox terms. We are not suggesting
that any unorthodox form of thought is inherently a mode of resistance, nor are we
naively embracing irrationality in opposition to rationality. We are suggesting,
however, that values such as rigour and intellectual quality be recast in ethical terms,
rather than as epistemological evaluations of thought’s conformity with the dominant
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mode. Resisting the formative function of schooling must involve the dominant way
of thinking being unsettled through relationships with others on the out-side of orthodox
thought; others who are also often excluded from the privileged in-side of capital and
power in State societies. Building these connections, and relinquishing the sovereignty
we accord to our own way of thinking, is our ethical responsibility to the other and a
form of political resistance to the imperialism of one dominant way of understanding
our world. Uncouple ethics from epistemology. Listen rather than convince; learn rather
than know.
Notes
1. See Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 374–80).
2. Connell (2007) argues that the ‘northerness’ of social theory is a result of ‘four character-
istic textual moves: the claim of universality; reading from the centre; gestures of exclusion;
and grand erasure’.
3. In this essay we borrow the concept of the ‘orthodox form of thought’ from Deleuze
(1994), but employ it to refer more generally to the dominant ways of thinking valued by,
and reproduced within, what Delpit refers to as the culture of power: ‘The upper and
middle classes send their children to school with all the accoutrements of the culture of
power; children from other kinds of families operate within perfectly wonderful and viable
cultures but not cultures that carry the codes or rules of power’ (1995, 25). To the extent
that this culture of power values the classical thought of Western intellectual traditions,
and is concentrated in the metropolitan centres of the global north, our notion of the ortho-
dox form of thought is intended to echo the arguments of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) and
Connell (2007).
4. Of course, we are not the first to use the concept of a ‘game’ to describe the way in which
its rules work to represent certain ‘plays’ in the game as ‘natural’ or legitimate, and others
as illegitimate. For example, see Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, 99–100).
5. While we give primacy to the axiological over the epistemological in the argument devel-
oped in this essay, we do not do so in terms of ‘axiological knowledge’. We follow Levinas
and Derrida and understand ethics not as a matter of knowing what we ought to do in
relation to others, but of being responsible to the other amidst irreducible uncertainty. The
impossibility of ever gaining access to an adequate axiological knowledge is the condition
for ethics, not its demise.
6. Duncan-Andrade and Morrell, and Delpit (1995) in her work, conceive this both/and
approach as a synthesis. Zipin, Brennan, and Sellar (2006) develop an alternative aporetic
conception of this both/and logic that emphasises the impossibility of satisfying both
demands of this approach in a synthetic manner.
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